Chronicles of the Peninsular Southwest (X): Almaraz and the black swans of peninsular relations

The normality of peninsular relations is generally measured by cordial ties of institutional good neighborliness and even personal friendship […]

The normality of peninsular relations is generally measured by cordial ties of institutional good neighborliness and even personal friendship between the respective political party leaders, beyond, of course, good economic and business relations within the framework of the single market and the European Union .

But “post-normality” will also affect, sooner or later, peninsular relations. I am convinced that this eventuality should not be underestimated, that is, the occurrence of one or more "black swans" should concern peninsular entities and institutions and a kind of preventive alert mechanism could and should guard against this eventuality in order to avoid harm bigger in the near future.

Moral hazard is everywhere, collateral damage too. The Almaraz plant and the recent problems are a good pretext to talk about the “imponderable events” in peninsular relations.

1. Almaraz
Almaraz is no longer even a “black swan in its pure state”. Between 1983 and 2016, there were half a hundred incidents at the plant. The international scale of nuclear events predicts seven levels of severity. Level 1 is treated as an anomaly, level 7 as a disaster equivalent to the accidents of Tchernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011).

On this international scale, the incidents in Almaraz have been put down to level zero, but that doesn't relieve us of worries, nor does it make us calm.

The construction of a nuclear waste landfill and the possible extension of the useful life of an old plant, located 100 km from the Portuguese border, are an added cause for concern.

Apparently, Spain's policy of faits accomplis could put peninsular relations at risk. The problem goes to the European institutions. The next episodes are awaited.

2. Transfers in peninsular rivers
At issue, once again, the Tagus river and the “water wars” for the XNUMXst century. We already know that the Iberian Peninsula will be particularly affected by the effects of climate change, particularly periods of severe drought.

Invoking “exceptional hydrological situations”, the Spanish government authorizes the transfer of large bodies of water from the Tagus basin to southern Spain, in particular to the provinces of Murcia, Alicante and Almeria.

In 2016, the decision of the central government in Madrid was contradicted by the regional government of Castilla-La Mancha and this is not the first time this has happened.

In bilateral relations, the Albufeira Convention regulates the basin management of peninsular rivers. In the case of the flows of the Tagus River, while on the Spanish side it is said that they were “scrupulously complied with”, on the Portuguese side it is said that the flows are “abnormally low”.

As the problems in question have to do with water supply to the population, energy production and intensive agriculture, sooner or later we will have territorial conflicts in perspective, not only within Spain but also between Portugal and Spain.

3. Brexit negotiations and impact on peninsular relations
The third black swan it concerns the possible collateral effects of the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union, that is, the discriminatory impact of the Brexit negotiations on the future of peninsular relations.

Above all, I am thinking about the options that multinational companies with tax headquarters in the United Kingdom can adopt and the “incentive war” of all kinds to attract these companies to the peninsular territory.

Madrid's centrality on the one hand, the old historical relationship between the United Kingdom and Portugal, on the other, will be some of the arguments used, which, I suspect, will not be enough to prevent some “last minute betrayals”.

In this respect, the Atlantic will no longer be, everything suggests, a peaceful ocean as it has been until now. For the rest, the policy of the new American president will be the “great black swan” of transatlantic relations.

4. NATO, strategic, logistical and operational changes
The fourth black swan it concerns security and defense policy. The US policy of containment in matters of defense and security, especially in the European theatre, leads me to think that another distribution of logistics and operating costs will be inevitable and that the European Union, sooner or later, will end up promoting another reallocation of resources in this matter, which will most likely include a change in the structure of territorial commands in Europe.

The eventual reorganization of this command structure could cause some discomfort in the peninsular relationship, given what has been the historical basis of our relationship within the NATO framework, which also includes the missions assigned to our insular territory.

5. The projection of territorial waters and conflicts of jurisdiction
The fifth black swan it concerns the projection of territorial waters and any conflicts of jurisdiction arising therefrom.

The review of the limits of the exclusive economic zones requested by the two Iberian countries and the consideration of the essential role played by the insular territories of the two countries, may be at the origin of some political-diplomatic mistakes of some relevance.

We are well aware of the importance of the maritime factor in the national strategic concept and the relevance of the next generation of maritime policies in the geopolitics of peninsular countries.

In this regard, the political-diplomatic symbolism surrounding the jurisdiction of the Desertas or Selvagens Islands is proof that an eventual “collision” of these two territorial projections must be approached and treated with extreme care to avoid greater harm.
6. Asymmetric shocks in the tourism sector
the sixth black swan it concerns asymmetric shocks impacting the tourism sector. Tourism is a vital sector for the two Iberian countries and any more significant asymmetric shock can immediately cause erratic flows and tourist visitation contingents within the peninsular space.

Here are some of these asymmetric shocks: the chronic lack of water in tourist areas, a serious nuclear accident in Spain, the pollution of rivers and rivers, an oil spill off the coast, a sudden influx of refugees, a serious political-diplomatic conflict around Gibraltar, a serious event resulting from an act of terrorism.

All of these events are possible and some may even be linked if they are not addressed in time. Peninsular relations will obviously be affected by these events.

7. Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla
the seventh black swan it concerns the geopolitics of the neighboring Maghreb space. Political stability in the Maghreb is an extraordinarily precious common good for the stability of peninsular relations.

The alignment of problems related to territorial jurisdiction over Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla is part of the same geostrategic chessboard and should be approached with extreme caution, so as not to repeat in the western Mediterranean what is already happening in the eastern Mediterranean.

The two peninsular countries should join forces at bilateral and multilateral levels and within the framework of the European Union to address, in a preventive and precautionary manner, the problems of the western Mediterranean that will not cease to arise.

8. Iberism, political radicalization and regionalist separatism
The last black swan it concerns social movements and the most radical movements in the party-political spectrum.

In this respect, the Brexit negotiations could be very instructive for the UK and the European Union, and also for the two peninsular countries.

The eventual territorial dismemberment of the United Kingdom would be a real political earthquake, an authentic black swan, with unpredictable consequences on the European political party system and the European separatist movements.

We would, perhaps, witness today unlikely alliances and coalitions and it would not surprise me that, alongside Catalan, Basque and Galician regionalist separatism, Iberian unionist currents emerged within the framework of the European Union, demanding greater protagonism for "European macroregions", such as the rest, the European Union itself has already suggested.

Final grade
As we can see, in almost all the cases mentioned, the absences and omissions of the European Union are at the origin and explain a large number of black swans.

For the rest, those mentioned here are not even, strictly speaking, “black swans in a pure state”.

There are already many signs that this could happen. Many of them are already on the march while waiting for a provocative element.

The most relevant is their interdependence and the fractal or chaotic effect. In this respect, the great black swan may well be transatlantic politics or the lack of it and the two Iberian countries at the forefront of the problems.

This, then, is the “post-normality” of peninsular relations. We are not sure if they will happen, when they will happen and who will make them happen.

In any case, and to reassure the most alarmed, I would like to recall here the great merit of the European institutions, namely, that of dealing with processes and procedures that transform serious problems into chronic problems. In the present times, it is not of minor importance.

 

Author António Covas is a full professor at the University of Algarve and a PhD in European Affairs from the Free University of Brussels

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